CRY-04 Secure key management
Operate key management spanning generation, certificate issuance, activation, storage isolated from application and middleware layers, authorised retrieval, rekeying, compromise handling, withdrawal and deletion, with se
4
artefacts
0
held by a system
0
at each review
hard
to go live
Policy repository / GRC workspace
where the evidence lives
teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review
system holds itEvidence a system already holds
none for this control
periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review
none for this control
governing documentDocuments that govern the control
- Key lifecycle procedure running from generation through to destruction · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Key register recording owner, purpose, cryptoperiod and next rotation date · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Proof that the key store operates separately from application and middleware tiers · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Key compromise response instruction and any compromise event that invoked it · Policy repository / GRC workspace
First move
This control is evidenced by people and documents, not systems. Put the document under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a record with reviewer and date. Do not try to automate it.
Common gaps auditors find
- Keys generated on general purpose systems with no assured source of entropy
- Rotation intervals defined on paper while expired keys stay in productive use
- Pre-shared secrets circulated by mail or chat with no dedicated handling provisions
Do this for your whole sheet
Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.
Build my evidence sheetCRY-03 Encryption of sensitive data for storage · DEV-01 Policies for the development/procurement of information systems