8.3.3 User identity is verified before modifying any authentication factor
User identity is verified before modifying any authentication factor.
5
artefacts
0
held by a system
2
at each review
hard
to go live
Policy repository / GRC workspace
where the evidence lives
teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review
system holds itEvidence a system already holds
none for this control
periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review
- Records of modification requests showing the verification performed · Identity provider / directory
- Evidence of a request refused because identity could not be verified · Identity provider / directory
governing documentDocuments that govern the control
- Procedures for modifying authentication factors, including the identity verification steps required · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Observation of security or service desk personnel performing a modification request, showing verification before the change · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- The verification methods permitted and their strength, such as knowledge questions, callback or a second channel · Policy repository / GRC workspace
First move
This control is evidenced by people and documents, not systems. Put the document under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a record with reviewer and date. Do not try to automate it.
Common gaps auditors find
- Verification uses information an attacker can obtain, such as employee number or manager name
- Self service reset relies on a channel the attacker may already control, such as the same mailbox
- Procedure documented but not followed under pressure, with no monitoring that would show it
Do this for your whole sheet
Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.
Build my evidence sheet8.3.2 Strong cryptography is used to render all authentication factors unreadable during transmission and storage on all system components · 8.3.4 Invalid authentication attempts are limited by: • Locking out the user ID after not more than 10 attempts. • Setting the lockout duration to a minimum of 30 minutes or until the user's identity