EvidenceSheet

8.3.2 Authentication factors unreadable with strong cryptography

Strong cryptography must be used to make all authentication factors unreadable both in transit and at rest on every system component. The testing procedures examine factor repositories and data transmissions. The guidance explains that some network devices and applications have sent or stored passwords in cleartext, letting an attacker capture them with a sniffer or read the files where they sit and then reuse them. Customized approach objective: nobody can obtain, derive or reuse a cleartext authentication factor by intercepting traffic or reading stored data.

Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1, 8.3.2. The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open PCI DSS v4.0.1 in the compliance library.

Version 4.0.1 is the active version; 4.0 has been retired. Appendix A1 applies only to multi-tenant service providers, A2 only to card-present POS POI terminals that still use SSL or early TLS, and A3 only when a payment brand or acquirer requires it. Which requirements apply to you follows your validation type.

4
artefacts
2
held by a system
1
at each review
easy
to go live
Identity provider / directory
where the evidence lives
teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review. To go live: easy when half or more of the artefacts are already held by a system, moderate from a quarter to a half, hard below a quarter.

These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.

system holds itEvidence a system already holds

  • Configuration showing password hashing algorithms and parameters for directories and applications · Identity provider / directory
  • Packet capture or protocol configuration showing authentication over TLS or equivalent · Identity provider / directory

periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review

  • Sample of credential stores showing hashed or encrypted values only · Identity provider / directory

governing documentDocuments that govern the control

  • Inventory of protocols in use with legacy cleartext protocols disabled · Policy repository / GRC workspace

First move

Automate the pull from your Identity provider / directory. Scheduled export of users, roles and MFA state from the directory; access-review completion pulled from the IdP, not a spreadsheet.

Common gaps auditors find

Do this for your whole sheet

Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.

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8.3.1 Access authenticated with at least one factor · 8.3.3 Identity verified before factor changes