3.6.1 Procedures protect keys against disclosure and misuse
The entity defines and carries out procedures to shield the keys securing stored account data against misuse and disclosure, covering: (1) key access limited to the smallest number of custodians needed; (2) no key-encrypting key is weaker than any data-encrypting key it wraps; (3) key-encrypting keys kept apart from data-encrypting keys; and (4) keys held securely in as few locations and forms as possible. Applicability: covers keys protecting stored account data and key-encrypting keys that protect data-encrypting keys; both kinds need protection, and key-encrypting keys need especially strong measures because one may unlock many data-encrypting keys. Guidance recommends a centralized, standards-based key management system. Objective under the customized approach: processes guarding stored-data keys against misuse and disclosure are defined and running.
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1, 3.6.1. The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open PCI DSS v4.0.1 in the compliance library.
Version 4.0.1 is the active version; 4.0 has been retired. Appendix A1 applies only to multi-tenant service providers, A2 only to card-present POS POI terminals that still use SSL or early TLS, and A3 only when a payment brand or acquirer requires it. Which requirements apply to you follows your validation type.
These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.
system holds itEvidence a system already holds
none for this control
periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review
none for this control
governing documentDocuments that govern the control
- Key management policy and procedures covering custodian limits, KEK strength, separation and storage · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Key inventory listing each DEK and KEK with strength and storage location · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Custodian list for each key · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Architecture showing KEK and DEK storage separation · Policy repository / GRC workspace
First move
Common gaps auditors find
- KEK weaker than the DEK it wraps (for example 2048-bit RSA wrapping AES-256 with no strength analysis)
- KEK and DEK held in the same configuration file
- Procedures silent on minimizing locations and forms of keys
Do this for your whole sheet
Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.
Build my evidence sheet3.5.1.3 Disk encryption access independent of OS authentication · 3.6.1.1 Service provider cryptographic architecture documented