3.5.1.2 Disk-level encryption with logical access controls
If disk-level or partition-level encryption is used to render PAN unreadable, it is implemented only on removable media or together with another mechanism that meets 3.5.1, with logical access separate from native OS aut
5
artefacts
1
held by a system
2
at each review
hard
to go live
Policy repository / GRC workspace
where the evidence lives
teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review
system holds itEvidence a system already holds
- Disk encryption configuration · Cloud console / configuration management
periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review
- Key custody records · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Architecture review · Cloud console / configuration management
governing documentDocuments that govern the control
- Documentation showing additional layer · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Logical access design separate from OS · Policy repository / GRC workspace
First move
Mostly documents and reviews. Pull the 1 system-held artefact from your Cloud console / configuration management on a schedule; put the documents under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a dated record with a named reviewer.
Common gaps auditors find
- Disk encryption alone on non-removable media
- Same credential for OS and encryption
- No layered control
Do this for your whole sheet
Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.
Build my evidence sheet3.5.1.1 Hashes of PAN use keyed cryptographic functions · 3.5.1.3 Disk-level encryption key management