What evidence do auditors commonly ask for on 2.3.2 Wireless encryption keys changed on triggers?

Key-management procedure defining key change triggers for personnel departure, role change and suspected compromise; Key change log cross-referenced to leaver and mover records for staff with key knowledge; Records of who holds knowledge of each wireless key; Incident records showing key changes after suspected compromise.

What is the most common gap auditors find on 2.3.2?

Pre-shared keys unchanged for years despite staff turnover

PCI DSS v4.0.1 · Req 2: Secure Configurations

`2.3.2` Wireless encryption keys changed on triggers

For wireless environments that connect to the CDE or carry account data, wireless encryption keys must be changed: (a) whenever someone who knows the key leaves the company or leaves the role for which that knowledge was needed; and (b) whenever compromise of a key is known or suspected. Applicability: no special notes; applies to every assessed entity. Customized approach objective: knowing a wireless encryption key cannot give anyone unauthorised access to wireless networks.

Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1, 2.3.2. The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open PCI DSS v4.0.1 in the compliance library.

Version 4.0.1 is the active version; 4.0 has been retired. Appendix A1 applies only to multi-tenant service providers, A2 only to card-present POS POI terminals that still use SSL or early TLS, and A3 only when a payment brand or acquirer requires it. Which requirements apply to you follows your validation type.

artefacts

held by a system

at each review

easy

to go live

Key management / PKI

where the evidence lives

teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review. To go live: easy when half or more of the artefacts are already held by a system, moderate from a quarter to a half, hard below a quarter.

These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.

system holds itEvidence a system already holds

Key change log cross-referenced to leaver and mover records for staff with key knowledge · Key management / PKI
Incident records showing key changes after suspected compromise · Key management / PKI

periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review

Records of who holds knowledge of each wireless key · Key management / PKI

governing documentDocuments that govern the control

Key-management procedure defining key change triggers for personnel departure, role change and suspected compromise · Policy repository / GRC workspace

First move

Automate the pull from your Key management / PKI. Key inventory, rotation dates and certificate expiry from the KMS or PKI.

Common gaps auditors find

Pre-shared keys unchanged for years despite staff turnover
No record of which personnel know the wireless keys, so leaver triggers cannot be applied
Key compromise not linked to the incident response process

Do this for your whole sheet

Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.

Build my evidence sheet

2.3.1 Wireless vendor defaults changed or confirmed secure · 3.1.1 Requirement 3 policies and procedures maintained and in use