SR-10 Inspection of systems or components
Requires organization-defined systems or components to be inspected to detect tampering, either at random, at organization-defined frequencies, or upon organization-defined indications that tampering may have occurred.
4
artefacts
0
held by a system
3
at each review
hard
to go live
Policy repository / GRC workspace
where the evidence lives
teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review
system holds itEvidence a system already holds
none for this control
periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review
- Defined inspection scope, trigger conditions and frequency · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Inspection records with findings for each inspection performed · Document repository
- Escalation records where tampering indications were found · Document repository
governing documentDocuments that govern the control
- Tamper evident measures applied to in scope components · Policy repository / GRC workspace
First move
This control is evidenced by people and documents, not systems. Put the document under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a record with reviewer and date. Do not try to automate it.
Common gaps auditors find
- Inspection defined for delivery only and never repeated in service
- Triggers undefined, so indications of tampering do not cause an inspection
- No baseline of expected condition, so tampering cannot be recognised
Do this for your whole sheet
Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.
Build my evidence sheetSR-9 Tamper Resistance and Detection. Implement a tamper protection program for the system, system component, or system service · SR-11 Component authenticity