What evidence do auditors commonly ask for on SI-7(7) Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity | Integration of Detection and Response?

System and information integrity policy; System and information integrity procedures; Procedures addressing software, firmware, and information integrity; Procedures addressing incident response; System design documentation; System configuration settings and associated documentation.

What is the most common gap auditors find on SI-7(7)?

Security-relevant changes detected by integrity tools are not fed into incident response as potential incidents

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 · SI - System and Information Integrity

`SI-7(7)` Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity | Integration of Detection and Response

Incorporate the detection of the following unauthorized changes into the organizational incident response capability: organization-defined security-relevant changes to the system.

Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, SI-7(7). The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 in the compliance library.

Base controls and their enhancements. Which apply follows the baseline you are assessed against (for example FedRAMP Moderate or High, or the low, moderate and high baselines of SP 800-53B). Text in square brackets is a parameter your organisation sets.

artefacts

held by a system

at each review

hard

to go live

Policy repository / GRC workspace

where the evidence lives

teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review. To go live: easy when half or more of the artefacts are already held by a system, moderate from a quarter to a half, hard below a quarter.

These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.

system holds itEvidence a system already holds

Incident response records · Document repository

periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review

Audit records · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Test of Organizational processes for incorporating the detection of unauthorized security-relevant changes into the incident response capability; software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools; mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the incorporation of detection of unauthorized securit · Document repository

governing documentDocuments that govern the control

System and information integrity policy · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System and information integrity procedures · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Procedures addressing software, firmware, and information integrity · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Procedures addressing incident response · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System design documentation · Document repository
System configuration settings and associated documentation · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System security plan · Policy repository / GRC workspace

First move

Mostly documents and reviews. Pull the 1 system-held artefact from your Document repository on a schedule; put the documents under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a dated record with a named reviewer.

Common gaps auditors find

Security-relevant changes detected by integrity tools are not fed into incident response as potential incidents
The organization never defined which unauthorized changes must be handled by the incident response capability

Do this for your whole sheet

Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.

Build my evidence sheet

SI-7(6) Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity | Cryptographic Protection · SI-7(8) Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity | Auditing Capability for Significant Events