EvidenceSheet

8.24 Use of cryptography

The organization is to define and apply rules for using cryptography effectively, key management included. Purpose: apply cryptography correctly and to good effect so information stays confidential, genuine or unaltered in line with business and security requirements and the legal, regulatory and contractual rules on cryptography. Guidance: consider a topic-specific cryptography policy setting general principles, needed to gain the benefits and avoid misuse; the protection level and classification of information, which determine the type, strength and quality of algorithms; encryption of information on mobile endpoints and storage media and in transit to them; the approach to key management, including generating and protecting keys and recovering encrypted information when keys are lost, compromised or damaged; roles for implementing the rules and for key management including generation; approved or mandatory standards, algorithms, cipher strengths, solutions and usage practices; and the effect of encryption on controls that inspect content, such as malware detection or content filtering. Take into account national regulations and restrictions on cryptography in different countries and cross-border flows of encrypted information (5.31), and make agreements with external cryptographic service providers such as certification authorities cover liability, service reliability and response times (5.22). Keys need secure handling across their whole life, from creation, storage, archiving, retrieval and distribution to retirement and destruction, based on agreed standards and procedures for: generating keys for different systems and applications; issuing and obtaining public key certificates; distributing keys to intended parties and activating them on receipt; storing keys and granting authorized access; changing or updating keys, with rules on when and how; handling compromised keys; revoking or deactivating keys, for instance on compromise or when a user leaves, archiving them in that case; recovering lost or corrupted keys; making backup or archive copies of keys; destruction of keys; logging and auditing key management; setting activation and deactivation dates so keys are used only within their permitted period; and handling legal demands for access to keys, such as producing decrypted evidence in court. All keys need protection from modification and loss, and secret and private keys also from unauthorized use and disclosure; equipment that generates, stores or archives keys is physically protected, and the authenticity of public keys often matters too. Other information: public key authenticity is usually handled through certificate authorities and certificates, or manually for small numbers of keys; cryptography supports confidentiality (encryption), integrity and authenticity (digital signatures, message authentication codes, file integrity checks), non-repudiation and authentication of users and entities; ISO/IEC 11770 covers key management.

Source: ISO/IEC 27002:2022, 8.24. The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open ISO/IEC 27002:2022 in the compliance library.

ISO/IEC 27002 is guidance on the Annex A controls; certification is against ISO/IEC 27001. Use this set when your sheet follows the 27002 numbering.

6
artefacts
1
held by a system
2
at each review
hard
to go live
Policy repository / GRC workspace
where the evidence lives
teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review. To go live: easy when half or more of the artefacts are already held by a system, moderate from a quarter to a half, hard below a quarter.

These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.

system holds itEvidence a system already holds

  • Key inventory or HSM and key management service records with logs of key management activity · Key management / PKI

periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review

  • Evidence of encryption on endpoints, removable media and data in transit, aligned with the policy · Endpoint management (MDM / EDR)
  • Assessment of cryptography laws for each relevant jurisdiction and of the impact of encryption on content inspection controls · Policy repository / GRC workspace

governing documentDocuments that govern the control

  • The topic-specific cryptography policy with approved algorithms, key lengths, protocols and usage by information classification · Policy repository / GRC workspace
  • Key management procedures covering generation, distribution, storage, rotation, revocation, recovery, backup, destruction and activation periods · Policy repository / GRC workspace
  • Contracts or SLAs with certification authorities and other cryptographic service providers covering liability, reliability and response times · Vendor register / contract repository

First move

Mostly documents and reviews. Pull the 1 system-held artefact from your Key management / PKI on a schedule; put the documents under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a dated record with a named reviewer.

Common gaps auditors find

Do this for your whole sheet

Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.

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8.23 Web filtering · 8.25 Secure development life cycle