EvidenceSheet

CC7.3 Evaluating security events to identify incidents

Security events are evaluated to decide whether they could cause, or have caused, a failure to meet objectives, and if so action is taken to prevent or address the failure. Points of focus: incident response procedures exist and their effectiveness is evaluated periodically; people running the security programme are told of detected events and review them; procedures analyse incidents and their impact on the system; and in privacy engagements, events are assessed for unauthorised use or disclosure of personal information and legal non-compliance, and the personal information affected is identified. The 2022 revision adds, for confidentiality engagements, assessing whether detected events could have or did expose or misuse confidential information and, where they did, identifying the information affected and acting to prevent a repeat.

Source: SOC 2 (2017 Trust Services Criteria), CC7.3. The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open SOC 2 (2017 Trust Services Criteria) in the compliance library.

These are criteria, not controls: you design controls that meet them, and which criteria are in scope follows the categories your report covers (Security always; Availability, Confidentiality, Processing Integrity and Privacy only if chosen). A Type 2 report tests that the controls operated across the period, so the evidence asked for is samples across that period, not one copy.

5
artefacts
2
held by a system
1
at each review
moderate
to go live
SIEM / log platform
where the evidence lives
teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review. To go live: easy when half or more of the artefacts are already held by a system, moderate from a quarter to a half, hard below a quarter.

These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.

system holds itEvidence a system already holds

  • Security event log showing triage decisions · SIEM / log platform
  • Incident records with impact analysis · Document repository

periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review

  • Confidential-data impact assessment and corrective actions for incidents involving confidential information (confidentiality engagements) · Policy repository / GRC workspace

governing documentDocuments that govern the control

  • Incident classification and severity criteria · Policy repository / GRC workspace
  • Privacy impact determination for incidents involving personal information · Policy repository / GRC workspace

First move

Start with the 2 of 5 artefacts that already live in a system (SIEM / log platform); keep the periodic reviews but log each one as a dated record with a named reviewer.

Common gaps auditors find

Do this for your whole sheet

Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.

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CC7.2 Monitoring system components for anomalies · CC7.4 Responding to security incidents