3.7.6 Split knowledge and dual control for manual key operations
Where staff perform manual key-management operations involving cleartext keys, key-management policies and procedures must be in place under which those operations are run with dual control and split knowledge. Applicability: applies to manual key-management operations; simply dividing a key into two parts does not comply, and any key component or share has to be generated either by an approved random number generator inside an SCD (an HSM or a point-of-interaction device with PTS approval, for example) OR in line with ISO 19592 or an equivalent standard for secret key share generation. Guidance defines split knowledge (each person holds only their own component, revealing nothing of others or the key) and dual control (two or more people needed to use a key or perform a key function), and warns that in m-of-n schemes a custodian must never know more than one component, now or previously. Examples of manual operations include generation, transmission, loading, storage and destruction. Objective under the customized approach: no one can know a cleartext secret or private key, and no single person can carry out operations involving cleartext keys.
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1, 3.7.6. The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open PCI DSS v4.0.1 in the compliance library.
Version 4.0.1 is the active version; 4.0 has been retired. Appendix A1 applies only to multi-tenant service providers, A2 only to card-present POS POI terminals that still use SSL or early TLS, and A3 only when a payment brand or acquirer requires it. Which requirements apply to you follows your validation type.
These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.
system holds itEvidence a system already holds
- Ceremony logs with signatures of all participants · SIEM / log platform
periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review
- Component generation records (SCD RNG or ISO 19592 method) · Document repository
- Safe or smart card access records per custodian · Document repository
governing documentDocuments that govern the control
- Key ceremony scripts requiring two or more custodians · Document repository
- Component custodian assignment register showing no person holds more than one component · Policy repository / GRC workspace
First move
Common gaps auditors find
- One administrator loads all key components alone
- Custodian reassigned from component A to component B
- Key split into two halves instead of full-length components
Do this for your whole sheet
Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.
Build my evidence sheet3.7.5 Retirement, replacement or destruction of keys · 3.7.7 Prevent unauthorized substitution of keys