11.6.1 Payment page tamper detection
The entity must deploy a mechanism for detecting changes and tampering which: warns personnel of any unauthorized modification (changes, additions, deletions and indicators of compromise) to the HTTP headers that affect security and to the scripts in payment pages, as those arrive in the consumer's browser; is set up to assess the HTTP headers and payment pages as received; and runs its functions either at least weekly or periodically at a frequency established by a targeted risk analysis the entity performs under all elements of Requirement 12.3.1. Applicability: it also applies to entities whose webpages embed a TPSP's or payment processor's payment page or form (for example iframes), but not to the scripts inside that embedded page or form, which are the TPSP's or processor's responsibility. The entity is not expected to install software in consumer systems or browsers; it is expected to use techniques like those the Guidance column lists as examples (CSP violation reporting, synthetic user monitoring, tamper-detection script, reverse proxies or CDNs). Objective under the customized approach: skimming code cannot be introduced into payment pages as received by the browser, and anti-skimming measures cannot be removed, without a timely alert. Future-dated: treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1, 11.6.1. The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open PCI DSS v4.0.1 in the compliance library.
Version 4.0.1 is the active version; 4.0 has been retired. Appendix A1 applies only to multi-tenant service providers, A2 only to card-present POS POI terminals that still use SSL or early TLS, and A3 only when a payment brand or acquirer requires it. Which requirements apply to you follows your validation type.
These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.
system holds itEvidence a system already holds
- Configuration of the tamper-detection tool (CSP reporting, synthetic monitoring or script monitoring) · SIEM / log platform
- Monitoring run logs showing weekly or risk-defined frequency · SIEM / log platform
- Sample alerts and response records for header or script changes · SIEM / log platform
periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review
- Targeted risk analysis where a non-weekly frequency is used · Document repository
governing documentDocuments that govern the control
- Inventory of payment pages and pages hosting embedded payment forms in scope · Policy repository / GRC workspace
First move
Common gaps auditors find
- Monitoring watches server-side files only, not what the browser receives
- Parent page hosting a processor iframe excluded from monitoring
- Security-impacting headers such as CSP not included
- No targeted risk analysis supporting a less-than-weekly frequency
Do this for your whole sheet
Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.
Build my evidence sheet11.5.2 Change detection on critical files · 12.1.1 Overall information security policy established and disseminated