1.4.1 NSCs between trusted and untrusted networks
NSCs are implemented between trusted and untrusted networks.
5
artefacts
0
held by a system
1
at each review
hard
to go live
Policy repository / GRC workspace
where the evidence lives
teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review
system holds itEvidence a system already holds
none for this control
periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review
- Architecture review document · Cloud console / configuration management
governing documentDocuments that govern the control
- Definition of trusted versus untrusted zones · Document repository
- Perimeter device configurations · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Network diagram with trust boundaries · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Asset inventory tagged by zone · Policy repository / GRC workspace
First move
This control is evidenced by people and documents, not systems. Put the document under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a record with reviewer and date. Do not try to automate it.
Common gaps auditors find
- Trust zones not defined
- Missing NSC at one perimeter
- Inconsistent enforcement across sites
Do this for your whole sheet
Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.
Build my evidence sheet1.3.3 NSCs between wireless and CDE · 1.4.2 Inbound traffic from untrusted networks restricted