What evidence do auditors commonly ask for on SI-4(5) System Monitoring | System-generated Alerts?

System and information integrity policy; System and information integrity procedures; Procedures addressing system monitoring tools and techniques; System monitoring tools and techniques documentation; System configuration settings and associated documentation; List of personnel selected to receive alerts.

What is the most common gap auditors find on SI-4(5)?

Compromise indicators that trigger alerts were never enumerated, so alert rules are ad hoc and incomplete

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 · SI - System and Information Integrity

`SI-4(5)` System Monitoring | System-generated Alerts

Alert organization-defined personnel or roles when the following system-generated indications of compromise or potential compromise occur: organization-defined compromise indicators.

Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, SI-4(5). The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 in the compliance library.

Base controls and their enhancements. Which apply follows the baseline you are assessed against (for example FedRAMP Moderate or High, or the low, moderate and high baselines of SP 800-53B). Text in square brackets is a parameter your organisation sets.

artefacts

held by a system

at each review

hard

to go live

Policy repository / GRC workspace

where the evidence lives

teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review. To go live: easy when half or more of the artefacts are already held by a system, moderate from a quarter to a half, hard below a quarter.

These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.

system holds itEvidence a system already holds

none for this control

periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review

System audit records · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Test of Organizational processes for intrusion detection and system monitoring; mechanisms supporting and/or implementing intrusion detection and system monitoring capabilities; mechanisms supporting and/or implementing alerts for compromise indicators · SIEM / log platform

governing documentDocuments that govern the control

System and information integrity policy · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System and information integrity procedures · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Procedures addressing system monitoring tools and techniques · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System monitoring tools and techniques documentation · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System configuration settings and associated documentation · Policy repository / GRC workspace
List of personnel selected to receive alerts · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Documentation of alerts generated based on compromise indicators · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System security plan · Policy repository / GRC workspace

First move

No system holds this evidence for you: it is people and documents. Reminders and routing to the owner still save time. Put the document under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a record with reviewer and date.

Common gaps auditors find

Compromise indicators that trigger alerts were never enumerated, so alert rules are ad hoc and incomplete
System-generated alerts go to a shared mailbox nobody watches instead of the defined personnel or roles

Do this for your whole sheet

Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.

Build my evidence sheet

SI-4(4) System Monitoring | Inbound and Outbound Communications Traffic · SI-4(7) System Monitoring | Automated Response to Suspicious Events