What evidence do auditors commonly ask for on SI-3(4) Malicious Code Protection | Updates Only by Privileged Users?

System and information integrity policy; System and information integrity procedures; Procedures addressing malicious code protection; List of privileged users on system; System design documentation; Malicious code protection mechanisms.

What is the most common gap auditors find on SI-3(4)?

Malicious code protection mechanisms update without direction from a privileged user

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 · SI - System and Information Integrity

`SI-3(4)` Malicious Code Protection | Updates Only by Privileged Users

Update malicious code protection mechanisms only when directed by a privileged user.

Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, SI-3(4). The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 in the compliance library.

Base controls and their enhancements. Which apply follows the baseline you are assessed against (for example FedRAMP Moderate or High, or the low, moderate and high baselines of SP 800-53B). Text in square brackets is a parameter your organisation sets.

artefacts

held by a system

at each review

hard

to go live

Policy repository / GRC workspace

where the evidence lives

teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review. To go live: easy when half or more of the artefacts are already held by a system, moderate from a quarter to a half, hard below a quarter.

These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.

system holds itEvidence a system already holds

List of privileged users on system · Identity provider / directory

periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review

Records of malicious code protection updates · Document repository
System audit records · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Test of Mechanisms supporting and/or implementing malicious code protection capabilities · Document repository

governing documentDocuments that govern the control

System and information integrity policy · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System and information integrity procedures · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Procedures addressing malicious code protection · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System design documentation · Document repository
Malicious code protection mechanisms · Document repository
System configuration settings and associated documentation · Policy repository / GRC workspace

First move

Mostly documents and reviews. Pull the 1 system-held artefact from your Identity provider / directory on a schedule; put the documents under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a dated record with a named reviewer.

Common gaps auditors find

Malicious code protection mechanisms update without direction from a privileged user
Non-privileged users can alter malicious code protection updates

Do this for your whole sheet

Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.

Build my evidence sheet

SI-3 Malicious Code Protection · SI-3(6) Malicious Code Protection | Testing and Verification