What evidence do auditors commonly ask for on SA-8(9) Security and Privacy Engineering Principles | Trusted Components?

Supply chain risk management plan; System and services acquisition policy; Procedures addressing the security design principle of trusted components used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system; System design documentation; Security, supply chain risk management, and privacy requirements and specifications for the system; System security and privacy architecture.

What is the most common gap auditors find on SA-8(9)?

Components are relied upon without assurance they are at least as trustworthy as the functions depending on them

NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 · SA - System and Services Acquisition

`SA-8(9)` Security and Privacy Engineering Principles | Trusted Components

Implement the security design principle of trusted components in organization-defined systems or system components.

Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, SA-8(9). The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 in the compliance library.

Base controls and their enhancements. Which apply follows the baseline you are assessed against (for example FedRAMP Moderate or High, or the low, moderate and high baselines of SP 800-53B). Text in square brackets is a parameter your organisation sets.

artefacts

held by a system

at each review

hard

to go live

Policy repository / GRC workspace

where the evidence lives

teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review. To go live: easy when half or more of the artefacts are already held by a system, moderate from a quarter to a half, hard below a quarter.

These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.

system holds itEvidence a system already holds

none for this control

periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review

Test of Organizational processes for applying the security design principle of trusted components in system specification, design, development, implementation, and modification; mechanisms supporting the application of the security design principle of trusted components in system specification, design, deve · Document repository

governing documentDocuments that govern the control

Supply chain risk management plan · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System and services acquisition policy · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Procedures addressing the security design principle of trusted components used in the specification, design, development, implementation, and modification of the system · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System design documentation · Document repository
Security, supply chain risk management, and privacy requirements and specifications for the system · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System security and privacy architecture · Policy repository / GRC workspace
Procedures for determining component assurance · Policy repository / GRC workspace
System security plan · Policy repository / GRC workspace

First move

No system holds this evidence for you: it is people and documents. Reminders and routing to the owner still save time. Put the document under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a record with reviewer and date.

Common gaps auditors find

Components are relied upon without assurance they are at least as trustworthy as the functions depending on them
Trust levels of components in the defined systems were never assessed

Do this for your whole sheet

Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.

Build my evidence sheet

SA-8(8) Security and Privacy Engineering Principles | Secure Evolvability · SA-8(10) Security and Privacy Engineering Principles | Hierarchical Trust