What evidence do auditors commonly ask for on CEK-19 Key Compromise?

Compromised key handling procedure; KMS settings restricting compromised keys to decrypt-only; Incident records of key compromise and actions taken; Re-encryption records after compromise.

What is the most common gap auditors find on CEK-19?

Compromised keys still permitted to encrypt

CSA CCM v4.1 · CEK - Cryptography, Encryption & Key Management

`CEK-19` Key Compromise

Processes, procedures and technical measures are defined, implemented and evaluated so that a compromised key encrypts information only under controlled circumstances and afterwards serves solely for decryption, never encryption, taking legal and regulatory requirements into account.

Source: CSA CCM v4.1, CEK-19. The statement above is our statement of the clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text, not the instrument verbatim. Open CSA CCM v4.1 in the compliance library.

Version 4.1 adds 11 controls (among them API security, log sanitisation and a service bill of materials) and renumbers several domains. CSA accepts v4.0.x during its transition; if your STAR assessment is still on v4.0.1, check the numbering against it.

artefacts

held by a system

at each review

easy

to go live

Key management / PKI

where the evidence lives

teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review. To go live: easy when half or more of the artefacts are already held by a system, moderate from a quarter to a half, hard below a quarter.

These are the artefacts auditors commonly ask for on this requirement, our guidance rather than text from the standard. Your assessor decides what is sufficient in your context, and asks for samples across the period when a report covers one.

system holds itEvidence a system already holds

KMS settings restricting compromised keys to decrypt-only · Key management / PKI
Incident records of key compromise and actions taken · Document repository

periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review

Re-encryption records after compromise · Document repository

governing documentDocuments that govern the control

Compromised key handling procedure · Policy repository / GRC workspace

First move

Automate the pull from your Key management / PKI. Key inventory, rotation dates and certificate expiry from the KMS or PKI.

Common gaps auditors find

Compromised keys still permitted to encrypt
No procedure for key compromise
Data not re-encrypted under new keys

Do this for your whole sheet

Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.

Build my evidence sheet

CEK-18 Key Archival · CEK-20 Key Recovery