INQ-04 Limiting Access to or Disclosure of Data in Investigation Requests
Operate procedures that confine a government agency to the data actually covered by its investigation request, and where the data cannot be clearly delimited, anonymise or pseudonymise it so only the customers under inve
4
artefacts
0
held by a system
2
at each review
hard
to go live
Policy repository / GRC workspace
where the evidence lives
teal = a system already holds it · olive = produced at each review
system holds itEvidence a system already holds
none for this control
periodic reviewEvidence produced at each review
- Records of anonymisation or pseudonymisation carried out before handover · Data governance / DLP tooling
- Review evidence confirming unrelated tenants were excluded from the extract · Document repository
governing documentDocuments that govern the control
- Extraction specification showing the scope filters applied to a disclosure · Policy repository / GRC workspace
- Procedure describing how to delimit data when the request scope is unclear · Policy repository / GRC workspace
First move
This control is evidenced by people and documents, not systems. Put the document under version control with an owner and review date, and log each review as a record with reviewer and date. Do not try to automate it.
Common gaps auditors find
- Whole datasets or shared tables handed over because filtering was difficult
- Other tenants' records included in an export without redaction
- Pseudonymisation applied but the reidentification key supplied alongside it
- No documented check that the extract matches the scope of the request
Do this for your whole sheet
Paste the rows you run your controls from and get this mapping for every control at once, with the periodic-review ones flagged and a first move per row. No account for the first run.
Build my evidence sheetINQ-03 Conditions for Access to or Disclosure of Data in Investigation Requests · OIS-01 Information Security Management System (ISMS)